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CONSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP UNDER ATTACK
JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN 1977, my article, The Citizenship of Draft Evaders after the Pardon,1 ana-lyzed the erroneous position taken by the U.S. government regarding
the effect of President Carter’s pardon of those who had gone abroad to
evade military service in Vietnam.2  Jody Powell, then White House Press
Secretary, indicated that, although the President had waived the criminal
penalties for draft evasion, he could not restore the citizenship that men
had forfeited by evading the draft.3  This misread the constitutional right
of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.4  That amend-
ment denies Congress power to revoke citizenship derived from it.5  While
persons who became citizens other than by the Fourteenth Amendment
are not so protected, the great majority of Americans are so protected.6
Alteration of the citizenship of Fourteenth Amendment citizens can only
be done by the citizens’ consent or a constitutional amendment.
Few Americans (including most lawyers) study U.S. citizenship and
the power, or lack of power, in Congress to affect it once acquired.  There-
fore, considerable confusion arises and persists in the public about citizen-
ship questions.  That a president of the United States, as with President
Carter, gets it wrong both demonstrates and supports this confusion.  The
TEA Party (supposedly an acronym for Taxed Enough Already Party) and
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1. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Citizenship of Draft Evaders After the Pardon, 22
VILL. L. REV. 531 (1977).
2. See Exec. Order No. 11,967, 42 Fed. Reg. 4393 (Jan. 24, 1977) (granting
Attorney General discretion to allow persons in violation of Military Selective Ser-
vice Act to reenter United States under same terms and conditions as aliens); see
also Proclamation No. 4483, 42 Fed. Reg. 4391 (Jan. 24, 1977) (pardoning any
person who violated or was convicted under Military Selective Service Act between
Aug. 4, 1964, and Mar. 28, 1973).
3. See Evaders Pardoned by Carter, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 22, 1977, at 5.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 261–62 (1967) (denying Congress ple-
nary power to take away American citizen’s citizenship without consent).  For a
discussion of the limits on Congress’s power to revoke American citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra Part IV.
6. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
(477)
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several Republican candidates for President have seized upon this confu-
sion to press three demands regarding constitutional citizenship.7
The demands did not originate with the TEA Party,8 and meeting
these demands would overturn precedents interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment stretching more than a century.  Two of the demands directly
challenge settled Fourteenth Amendment law, while the third addresses
the citizenship requirement for election as President.9  A correct resolu-
tion of the third demand, however, turns as much on the understanding
of citizenship established under the Fourteenth Amendment as it does on
the Presidential Qualifications Clause.  The demands are:
That persons born in the United States be denied U.S. citizen-
ship if one or both parents are not legal residents of the United
States;10
That persons who commit or support terrorist acts against the
United States be stripped of their citizenship;11 and
7. See, e.g., Anne Schroeder Mullins, T.E.A. = Taxed Enough Already, POLITICO
(Apr. 8, 2009, 1:36 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/anneschroeder/0409/
TEA__Taxed_Enough_Already.html [https://perma.cc/W9MP-AYMD]; see also
Daniel Gonza´lez & Dan Nowicki, What If U.S. Ended Birthright Citizenship?, ARIZ.
REP., Sept. 14, 2015, at A1 (reporting several Republican candidates support of
“repealing” birthright citizenship for children born in United States to undocu-
mented alien parents), available at http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/polit-
ics/immigration/2015/09/04/what-if-united-states-ended-birthright-citizenship/
71672896/ [https://perma.cc/P99U-5GND]; Paul Mulshine, After Tuesday, It’s
Time for the Tea Party to Leave, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NH), Nov. 7, 2013, at 19,
available at http://blog.nj.com/njv_paul_mulshine/2013/11/after_tuesday_its_
time_for_the.html [https://perma.cc/T77T-NLC2]; Christine Show, Political Activ-
ists Gather to Pray, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 9, 2009, at J4; David Weigel, Rand Paul
Explains Why He Wants to Stop ‘Birthright Citizenship,’ WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2015,
available at 2015 WLNR 24686462; WND Questions Rubio’s Eligibility—but Not Cruz’s,
CONWEBBLOG, Apr. 14, 2015, available at 2015 WLNR 10901726 (concluding Ted
Cruz is eligible to run for President even though he was born in Canada while
Marco Rubio is not even though he was born in Florida).
8. The lineage of the various proposals will be discussed in the analysis of
each proposal.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
10. See Jennifer Rubin, Right-Wingers Deny Constitutional Reality, WASH. POST,
Aug. 20, 2015, available at 2015 WLNR 24733811 (noting some politicians support
repealing birthright citizenship); see also Christopher Parker, The (Real) Reason the
House Won’t Pass Comprehensive Immigration Reform, L.A. PRENSA, Aug. 8, 2014, at 6
(reporting 66% of TEA Party conservatives oppose birthright citizenship), available
at http://laprensa-sandiego.org/editorial-and-commentary/commentary/the-real-
reason-why-the-house-wont-pass-comprehensive-immigration-reform/ [https://per
ma.cc/ARG6-399F].  For a discussion of this claim, see infra Part III.
11. See Robert Costa & Ed O’Keefe, GOP Senators Call for Special Forces in Iraq
and Syria, as Obama Officials Plan Hill Briefings, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2014, available
at 2014 WLNR 24823328 (indicating Ted Cruz plans to introduce bill to strip citi-
zenship from supporters of terrorists); see also Kellan Howell, Conservatives Raise
Call to Strip Jihadists of U.S. Citizenship, as Ted Cruz Pushes Exile, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2014, available at 2014 WLNR 24080310 (noting some conservative politicians call
to strip American citizenship from those who leave United States to join certain
militant groups); Edward Schumacher Matos, Citizens All, or Not?, WASH. POST, Jan.
2
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That persons are not “natural born citizens” if one or both of
their parents were not citizens at the time of the person’s birth in
the United States, but persons born abroad are “natural born citi-
zens” if one or both parents were U.S. citizens at the time of their
birth (trying to state this “principle” coherently is challenging).12
In this Article, I explore the three demands and consider their consti-
tutionality if enacted by statute.13  In doing so, I traverse many precedents
that I analyzed in 1977, as well as consider the developments over the
nearly forty years since.  I will not provide extended argument over
whether any or all of the demands should become amendments to the
Constitution, in part because such amendments are unlikely to garner a
two-thirds majority of both Houses of Congress and legislative majorities in
three-fourths of the states.14
15, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 1532246; Wayne Slater, Republican Scott Brown
Says He Gave Ted Cruz the Idea to Strip the Citizenship of Americans Who Fight for ISIS,
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 16, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 25669376.  For fur-
ther discussion of this claim, see infra Part IV.
12. See, e.g., WND Questions Rubio’s Eligibility—but Not Cruz’s, supra note 7.  For
further discussion of this claim, see infra Part V.
13. See Stephen Covell, Current Development, Immigration Reduction Act of
1994, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 494, 494 (1994) (noting Title VII of proposed statute
eliminated birthright citizenship); Daniel P. Derechin, Current Development, De-
nying Birthright Citizenship to Those Born in the U.S. to Undocumented Aliens, 11 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 911, 913–14 (1997) (stating congressional subcommittee considered
denying birthright citizenship to those born in United States to undocumented
parents); Laurel Tuell Parcher & Brad Winter, Current Development, Bills in the
103d Congress, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 315, 317 (1994) (explaining proposed bill would
eliminate automatic birthright citizenship); see also Birthright Citizenship: Is It the
Right Policy for America?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Border Sec. of
the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lof-
gren) (noting congressional Republicans called for legislation and constitutional
amendment to restrict birthright citizenship in 2010); Sara Catherine Barnhart,
Note, Second Class Delivery: The Repeal of Birthright Citizenship as a Repeal of the “Pursuit
of Happiness,” 42 GA. L. REV. 525, 541–45 (2008) (discussing several bills to repeal
birthright citizenship introduced in 2005 or 2007); Dana Gayeski, Comment, Give
Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Legal: Why Efforts to Repeal Birthright Citizenship Are
Unconstitutional and Un-American, 21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 215, 228–35
(2011) (discussing federal and state bills to restrict birthright citizenship); Beah
Mejia, Legislative Updates, H.R.140: “Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011,” 7 MOD. AM.
81, 81–82 (2011) (describing bill introduced in 2011 to circumscribe birthright
citizenship).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. V.  I leave aside the possibility of proposing constitu-
tional amendments through a national convention, a process that would still re-
quire ratification by three-fourths of the states.  For consideration of some of the
issues that would arise were the Citizenship Clause amended, see generally Emily
Kendall, Amending the Constitution to Save a Sinking Ship? The Issues Surrounding the
Proposed Amendment of the Citizenship Clause and “Anchor Babies,” 22 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L.J. 349 (2012); Claudine Pease-Wingenter, Empowering Our Children to Dream
Without Limitations: A Call to Revisit the “Natural Born Citizen” Requirement in the
Obama Era, 29 CHICANA/O–LATINA/O L. REV. 43 (2010); Malinda L. Seymore, The
Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship, 2005 BYU L. REV. 927.
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In Part II, I discuss the TEA Party approach to constitutional interpre-
tation and delineate how the demands regarding constitutional citizenship
fit into this approach.  In Part III, I examine the claimed power to deny
birthright citizenship to some persons born in the United States under
U.S. jurisdiction.  In Part IV, I consider the limited power of the Congress
to revoke U.S. citizenship.  In Part V, I explore the concept of a “natural
born citizen” as a qualification for President of the United States.  Finally,
in Part VI, I offer a few general conclusions from this parsing of the argu-
ments of TEA Party adherents (TEA Partiers).
II. THE TEA PARTY’S APPROACH TO THE CONSTITUTION
The TEA Party is a diverse movement without centralized leadership
and thus without an authoritatively prescribed platform.15  Nonetheless,
most TEA Partiers subscribe to certain characteristic patterns of legal and
political claims.16  The central characteristic of these claims is the view
that TEA Party members (a fairly large number of whom are white, some-
what older men with significant property and wealth) are being oppressed
by a “tyrannical” U.S. government, creating a need to “take back” the
country.17  Why such people, who normally exercise considerable power
15. See Amy Gardner, Gauging the Scope of the Tea Party Movement in America,
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar-
ticle/2010/10/23/AR2010102304000.html [https://perma.cc/699G-JA82]; Wash.
Post Canvass, An Up-Close Look at the Tea Party and Its Role in the Midterm Elections:
Mapping the Tea Party, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010 [hereinafter Up-Close Look], http:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/tea-party-canvass/ [https://pe
rma.cc/3WKC-UKK4]; see also Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party’s Constitution, 88
DENV. U. L. REV. 559, 560–61 (2011) [hereinafter Goldstein, Tea Party’s Constitu-
tion]; Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 193, 194 (2011) [hereinafter Schmidt, Tea Party and the Constitution].
16. See generally RONALD P. FORMISANO, THE TEA PARTY: A BRIEF HISTORY
(2012); KATE ZERNIKE, BOILING MAD: INSIDE TEA PARTY AMERICA (1st St. Martin’s
Griffin ed. 2011) (2010); Up-Close Look, supra note 15.
17. See Kate Zernike & Megan Thee–Brenan, Poll Finds Tea Party Backers
Wealthier and More Educated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at A1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/politics/15poll.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
8V62-Y5SK]; see also Jamal Greene, The Alchemy of Dissent, 45 TULSA L. REV. 703, 703
(2010); Matt Flegenheimer, Cheers, Puns and Protest Welcome Donald Trump in Dallas,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2015, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/
15/us/politics/cheers-puns-and-protest-welcome-donald-trump-in-dallas.html
[https://perma.cc/BY8F-7K9C] (reporting Trump’s call to “take back our coun-
try”); Matt Flegenheimer, Varied Pleas as Candidates Press Cases at Conservative Forum,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/
19/us/politics/varied-pleas-as-candidates-press-cases-at-conservative-forum.html
[https://perma.cc/CG8S-9DEP] (reporting Carly Fiorina’s call to “take our gov-
ernment back” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally JILL LEPORE, THE
WHITES OF THEIR EYES: THE TEA PARTY’S REVOLUTION AND THE BATTLE OVER AMERI-
CAN HISTORY (2010).  This is a long-standing trope on the right in American politi-
cal life. See Jared A. Goldstein, The American Liberty League and the Rise of
Constitutional Nationalism, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 287 (2014).
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in the United States, need to take America back and from whom are inter-
esting questions that I will leave aside.18
While the TEA Party approach to politics has aptly, if oxymoronically,
been called a “libertarian mob,” TEA Partiers have sought to buttress their
political activism with a highly developed theory of the correct meaning of
the U.S. Constitution.19  I do not attempt a detailed analysis of the TEA
Partiers’ constitutional theories in this Article.20  Here, I briefly summa-
rize the TEA Partiers’ most central theses and analyze their demands re-
garding constitutional citizenship and whether those demands can be
squared with the Constitution that TEA Partiers profess to revere.
TEA Partiers generally espouse “originalism”—the concept that the
correct meaning of constitutional or statutory provisions is found in the
“original meaning” or the meaning originally “intended” by the drafters or
enactors of the relevant language.21  Ironically, all too often the “original
meaning” put forth by TEA Partiers relies on a record that is at best ambig-
uous or actually contradicts their position.22  Nowhere was this better illus-
18. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 187–90 (2008); Greene, supra note 17, at 709; Matt Bai, Obama the Other,
Deployed as Election Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A23, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/us/politics/16bai.html [https://perma.cc/H8MW-MR
7K]; Jonathan Martin, Republicans Fear That Trump and Rivals Are Hardening Party’s
Tone on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2015, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/09/08/us/politics/republicans-fear-donald-trump-is-hardening-partys-
tone-on-race.html [https://perma.cc/NXX7-KVBG]; Arian Campo–Flores, Are Tea
Partiers Racist?, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 25, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
are-tea-partiers-racist-70695 [http://perma.cc/54GE-AK9U].
19. See Mark Lilla, The Tea Party Jacobins, N.Y. REV. BOOKS May 27, 2010, at 53
(describing new wave of libertarianism and populism), available at http://www
.nybooks.com/articles/2010/05/27/tea-party-jacobins/ [https://perma.cc/H88R-
55ED].
20. For extended analysis of the TEA Party theories of the Constitution, see,
e.g., Goldstein, Tea Party’s Constitution, supra note 15; Greene, supra note 17;
Schmidt, Tea Party and the Constitution, supra note 15.
21. See DICK ARMEY & MATT KIBBE, GIVE US LIBERTY: A TEA PARTY MANIFESTO
66 (2010); ANGELO M. CODEVILLA, THE RULING CLASS: HOW THEY CORRUPTED
AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 42–43 (2010); MARK R. LEVIN, LIBERTY
AND TYRANNY: A CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO 36 (2009); see also LEPORE, supra note 17,
at 156; David Chang, Beyond Formalist Sovereignty: Who Can Represent “We the People of
the United States” Today?, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 549, 551 (2011) (noting Tea Party
Patriots believe knowing original meaning of Constitution is possible); Goldstein,
Tea Party’s Constitution, supra note 15, at 559–60 (stating Tea Party members do not
believe Constitution needs to be interpreted); Schmidt, Tea Party and the Constitu-
tion, supra note 15, at 201–12, 249 (discussing Tea Party’s advocacy for original-
ism). See generally Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement
and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2012).
22. See Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular
Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 850–56 (2011) [hereinafter Goldstein, Perils of
Popular Originalism]; Greene, supra note 17, at 708–09; Sanford Levinson, Who, If
Anyone, Really Trusts “We the People”?, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 311, 317 (2011) (foot-
note in title omitted); Schmidt, Tea Party and the Constitution, supra note 15, at
194–95, 197, 211–12; Ilya Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular Constitutional-
ism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300 (2011).
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trated than when TEA Party-supported members of Congress insisted on
reading the Constitution aloud in the well of the House of Representatives
but then omitted parts that they did not like from the reading.23  This
confusion derives in part from the reliance by many TEA Partiers, not on
the Constitution itself nor on traditional legal or historical scholarship on
the Constitution, but on the bizarre ideas of Cleon Skousen.24
At bottom, the TEA Party theory of the Constitution centers on the
idea that, just as the Constitution was created by the people of the United
States (or perhaps by the people of the several states), the people should
be the body that properly interprets the Constitution and thus determines
whether governmental action is constitutional.25  Like many ideas es-
poused by TEA Partiers, this notion of “popular constitutionalism” did not
originate with the TEA Party, but it has brought the theory into the fore-
front of contemporary political debate.26  The theory overlooks that the
Constitution was actually drafted by an aristocratic group that did not trust
popular government and presumably would not have accepted the notion
of a “popular constitutionalism”—that is, after all, why they gave us a writ-
ten Constitution.27  One does not, however, have to accept the Supreme
Court as the exclusive organ for authoritative interpretation of the Consti-
tution to recognize the central role of the Court in such interpretation,
23. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Constitution Has Its Day (More or Less) in House, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/
politics/07constitution.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5QP4-HDQ6] (noting most
of what was omitted pertained to slavery).
24. See W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICA: THE SUBSTANCE AND
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985) [hereinafter SKOUSEN II]; see also W. CLEON
SKOUSEN, THE FIVE THOUSAND YEAR LEAP: 28 GREAT IDEAS THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD (1981) [hereinafter SKOUSEN I].  For a discussion of Skousen’s importance
to the TEA Party, as well as critiques of his thought, see Goldstein, Tea Party’s Con-
stitution, supra note 15; Goldstein, Perils of Popular Originalism, supra note 22, at
839–50; Schmidt, Tea Party and the Constitution, supra note 15, at 202–03, 211,
215–16.  Others have found the roots of TEA Party constitutionalism in the many
books and articles of Richard Epstein, perhaps best summarized in RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIM-
ITED GOVERNMENT (2014).  That Epstein’s views are as “eccentric” as Skousen’s, see
Cass R. Sunstein, The Man Who Made Libertarians Wrong About the Constitution, NEW
REP. (May 19, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117619/classical-lib-
eral-constitution-richard-epstein-reviewed [https://perma.cc/4XZ7-R5GY].
25. See generally MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS
DESTROYING AMERICA (2006); see also Chang, supra note 21; Jared A. Goldstein, Can
Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLO-
QUY 288, (2011); Levinson, supra note 22; Schmidt, Tea Party and the Constitution,
supra note 15; Zietlow, supra note 21.
26. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999); Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 425, 426–28 (2005); Christopher W. Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism on
the Right: Lessons from the Tea Party, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 523, 527–30 (2011) [herein-
after Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism].
27. See Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 547–49.  Note how
easily TEA Partiers forsake “originalism.”
6
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particularly in protecting the rights of “discrete and insular minorities”
from overreaching by the majority.28
TEA Partiers also generally assert that the federal government is
merely delegated powers from the states and therefore should be strictly
limited to the powers expressly spelled out in the Constitution to avoid
treading on the powers of the states for which the federal government is
an agent, as well as to protect individual liberty, and that the federal gov-
ernment exists primarily to protect private property and freedom of con-
tract.29  Some TEA Partiers go further, claiming that the original
Constitution (including the Bill of Rights) is a divine covenant between
the people and the Christian God and therefore any amendment that dis-
torts the original shape of the Constitution contravenes the divine consti-
tutional plan.30  Each of these claims is highly contestable and also
contradicts long-settled precedent set primarily, although not exclusively,
28. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  For a critique, see Sanford
Levinson, The Twenty-First Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession in American
Political Rhetoric: Frivolousness Incarnate or Serious Arguments to Be Wrestled with?, 67
ARK. L. REV. 17, 35–49 (2014) and United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938).  Opponents of Brown v. Board of Education often employed the
rhetoric of popular constitutionalism and the will of the majority to justify resis-
tance to the decision. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also
Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 26, at 551–52 (2011). See generally
Michael Serota, Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1637 (2012).
29. See Ben Hoffman, Tea Party Manifesto, DRUDGE RETORT (Apr. 27, 2010,
8:00 AM), https://drudgeretort.wordpress.com/2010/04/27/tea-party-manifesto
[https://perma.cc/JF8F-HBVY]; see also Edward A. Fallone, Charters, Compacts, and
Tea Parties: The Decline and Resurrection of a Delegation View of the Constitution, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1067 (2010); A. E. Dick Howard, The Constitution and the Role
of Government, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 449, 495–502 (2012); Elizabeth Price Foley,
Sovereignty, Rebalanced: The Tea Party & Constitutional Amendments, 78 TENN. L. REV.
751 (2011).  So central is this claim that the TEA Party has succeeded in reviving
the notion of state nullification notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and the discrediting of nullification in the disputes of the early nine-
teenth century culminating in the Civil War. See THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., NULLIFICA-
TION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2010); see also
Levinson, supra note 28; Austin Raynor, Student Article, The New State Sovereignty
Movement, 90 IND. L.J. 613 (2015); James H. Read & Neal Allen, Living, Dead, and
Undead: Nullification Past and Present, 1 AM. POL. THOUGHT 263 (2012); Schmidt,
Tea Party and the Constitution, supra note 15, 218–21; Schmidt, Popular Constitutional-
ism, supra note 26, at 539–42.  Randy Barnett has developed a more sophisticated
argument for nullification in his proposed “repeal amendment” to the Constitu-
tion that would authorize collective action by the legislatures of two-thirds of the
states to repeal federal legislation. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Case for the
Repeal Amendment, 78 TENN. L. REV. 813 (2011).  Whether this would actually ac-
complish much is open to question. See SKOUSEN I, supra note 24, at 87–91,
124–26, 341; Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 COR-
NELL L. REV. 527 (2015); Goldstein, supra note 15, Tea Party’s Constitution, at
570–71, 575; Sanford Levinson, Afterword: Full of Sound and Fury but Signifying Lit-
tle?, 78 TENN. L. REV. 867 (2011); Schmidt, Tea Party and the Constitution, supra note
15, at 224–26, 228–33, 237–48; Hoffman, supra note 29.
30. See, e.g., SKOUSEN I, supra note 24, at 38–40, 73–77, 103–04; SKOUSEN II,
supra note 24, at 41–62, 225–31; see also Goldstein, Tea Party’s Constitution, supra
note 15, at 562, 564–65, 572–73; Sanford Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional
7
Dellapenna: Constitutional Citizenship Under Attack
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
484 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 477
by the Supreme Court.31  The turn towards “popular constitutionalism”
allows TEA Partiers to contend that decisions of the Court do not deter-
mine the proper meaning of the Constitution.32
I do not trace the origins of, or problems with, these general claims
here.  A grasp of these underlying ideas helps elucidate how ideas about
constitutional citizenship that fly in the face of established law can take
hold among TEA Partiers.  By appealing to “popular constitutionalism,”
TEA Partiers feel entitled to disregard well-established Supreme Court
precedents on these issues, appealing instead to a purported “plain mean-
ing” or “original intent.”33  On this basis, many TEA Partiers have con-
cluded that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee U.S.
citizenship to children born to undocumented migrants even though they
are born in the United States.34  Many TEA Partiers would thus have Con-
gress enact a statute denying some persons born in the United States
“birthright citizenship” despite the plain language of the Amendment and
clear holdings of precedents going back more than a century.35  Many
TEA Partiers would also strip citizenship from persons who support terror-
ist acts against the United States.36  Established precedent has been to the
contrary for nearly half-a-century.37  Rejection of these precedents fits
nicely with the idea of “taking back America,” both from a perceived flood
of immigrants (a recurring nightmare for nativist thought in the United
States for nearly 200 years) and disloyal people who support America’s
enemies.38
The third TEA Party claim turns on the requirement that one must be
a “natural born Citizen” to be elected President.39  The meaning of “natu-
Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 956, 959–61 (2012); Schmidt, Tea Party and the Constitution,
supra note 15, at 201–02, 204–06.
31. See Schmidt, Tea Party and the Constitution, supra note 15, at 194–95, 197.
32. See CODEVILLA, supra note 21, at xvii–xviii; Schmidt, Tea Party and the Con-
stitution, supra note 15, at 199–201, 218.
33. See CODEVILLA, supra note 21, at 44; see also ZERNIKE, supra note 17, at 8;
Schmidt, supra note 15, Tea Party and the Constitution, at 200–01, 206–09.  This con-
flates the “textualist” and the “originalist” approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion, something that many TEA Partiers do. See Josh Blackman, Back to the Future
Originalism, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 325 (2013); James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitu-
tion: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2011).
34. But see Bill Steiden, Tackling ‘Birthright Citizenship,’ ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug.
15, 2010, at A6 (reporting Lindsey Graham argues constitutional amendment is
necessary to deal with birthright citizenship).
35. For a further discussion of these issues, see infra notes 45–94.
36. See Costa & O’Keefe, supra note 11 (indicating Ted Cruz plans to intro-
duce bill to strip citizenship from supporters of terrorists); Monica Crowley, How
Ted Cruz Is Running the Republican Table, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2015, available at
2015 WLNR 26802591; Matos, supra note 11; Slater, supra note 11.
37. For a further discussion of these issues, see infra Part IV.
38. See generally DAVID H. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR: FROM NATIVIST MOVE-
MENTS TO THE NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1988); LEPORE, supra note 17.
39. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
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ral born citizen” is also contested from a desire to “take back America.”40
That language has not been authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme
Court, but cases decided by the Court do provide points of reference for
the interpretation of the phrase.41  Some TEA Partiers, as well as others
called “birthers,” have invoked the supposed plain meaning of the phrase
to argue that President Obama is not eligible to be President.42  Some but
not all of these Obama critics, however, are not troubled by Ted Cruz’s
candidacy for President although Cruz was born in Canada.43  Stating a
coherent legal principle to justify both of these conclusions is difficult.
One can finesse these difficulties if one buys into certain highly unlikely
factual claims made by many “birthers” who contend that Obama is not
really President.44
III. BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP
The U.S. Constitution did not define United States or state citizen-
ship in 1787.  It mentions citizenship regarding qualifications for public
office and a provision conferring the “privileges and immunities” of citi-
zens of each state on citizens of other states, but does not define either
citizenship or privileges and immunities.45  The failure to address funda-
mental questions of citizenship allowed the Supreme Court free reign in
Dred Scott v. Sandford46 to conclude that persons of African descent were
not and could not be citizens of the United States or of any state.  This
decision fed into the heated debate that led to the Civil War just a few
years later.
40. See generally LEPORE, supra note 17.
41. For a further discussion of these issues, see infra notes 136–74 and accom-
panying text.
42. See, e.g., Danielle Allen, Birthers, ‘Trumpists,’ and a Crisis for the GOP, WASH.
POST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/birthers-trump
ists-and-a-crisis-for-the-gop/2015/09/04/3b3e2074-5308-11e5-8c19-0b6825aa4a3a_
story.html [https://perma.cc/PS2W-4TM3].  No one seems to have found much in
the way of original intent or original meaning to parse this language.
43. See, e.g., William A. Jacobson, Natural Born Citizens: Marco Rubio, Bobby
Jindal, Ted Cruz, LEGAL INSURRECTION (Sept. 3, 2013), http://legalinsurrection
.com/2013/09/natural-born-citizens-marco-rubio-bobby-jindal-ted-cruz/ [https://
perma.cc/5VHG-7FUK]; Doug Mataconis, Yes, Ted Cruz Is a “Natural Born Citizen,”
OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/yes-
ted-cruz-is-a-natural-born-citizen/ [https://perma.cc/UP54-2KY4].  Some birthers
have opposed Cruz as well as Obama. See, e.g., Steven Nelson, Ted Cruz Inherits
‘Birthers’ with Presidential Bid, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www
.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/03/24/ted-cruz-inherits-birthers-with-presiden
tial-bid [https://perma.cc/CXH5-VESR].
44. We shall return to these “factual” claims in Part VI, infra notes 175–78.
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (House of Representatives); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senate); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (President); see also U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.  The Constitution also authorized Congress to enact a
uniform rule of naturalization. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
46. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
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The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in part to reverse Dred Scott,
declaring in its first sentence that, “All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside.”47  The Supreme Court
had to determine the reach of this language several times during the first
half-century after it was adopted.  The exclusion of persons born in the
United States who were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
when they were born applied to the children of persons entitled to diplo-
matic immunity, to the children of visiting (or invading) military person-
nel who were also accorded immunity from the jurisdiction of the United
States, or to children born on foreign-flagged vessels in U.S. waters.48
Whether there were other implicit limitations to “birthright citizenship”
was less clear, although the legislative history of the Clause would seem to
reject that possibility.49
The Court might have construed the Fourteenth Amendment as only
confirming the citizenship of ex-slaves so that it would not apply to anyone
not of African descent.  Or it might have read the Clause as excluding
persons who, at birth, were not subject to the “complete and exclusive”
jurisdiction of the United States.50  The text of the Citizenship Clause
does not state either proposition.  Proponents of reading in a requirement
that jurisdiction be “complete and exclusive” argue that the “subject to the
jurisdiction” language would otherwise be meaningless because all persons
born in the United States are necessarily subject to its jurisdiction—ignor-
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,
72–73 (1872); see also Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165 (2011); James C. Ho,
Defining “American”: Birthright Citizenship and the Original Understanding of the 14th
Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 367, 369 (2006); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Govern-
ment’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV.
477 (1998).
48. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 682–85, 693 (1898); In re
Thenault, 47 F. Supp. 952, 953 (D.D.C. 1942); see also Sarah Helene Duggin &
Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous
Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need to Fix
It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 99–100 (2005); James C. Ho, Birthright Citizenship, the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the Texas Legislature, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 161, 163 (2007).
49. See Ho, supra note 48; see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 87 (1988); Garret
Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A “Legislative History,” 60 AM. U. L. REV. 331 (2010);
Matthew Ing, Birthright Citizenship, Illegal Aliens, and the Original Meaning of the Citi-
zenship Clause, 45 AKRON L. REV. 719 (2012); Kendall, supra note 14, at 352–56;
Mark Shawhan, “By Virtue of Being Born Here”: Birthright Citizenship and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2012).  While the Supreme Court
did not find the legislative history unequivocal, it did seem to conclude that it
generally supported the lack of power in Congress to redefine citizenship. See
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 258–68 (1967).
50. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, Born in the U.S.A.? Rethinking Birthright Citizen-
ship in the Wake of 9/11, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 167, 170 (2007).
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ing diplomatic and military immunities, as well as foreign-flagged vessels.51
Such a reading proves too much because a great many children of lawful
immigrants born before their parents’ naturalization would be excluded
from citizenship, as would their descendants down to the present day.
Ironically, this probably includes some TEA Partiers who support such a
reading of the Citizenship Clause.
In its first decision construing the Citizenship Clause, the Court de-
cided that the Clause included white women born in the United States
without settling the scope of the Clause.52  In its next decision, Elk v. Wil-
kins,53 the Court concluded that American Indians were not citizens even
though they were born in the United States.  The Court rested its decision
on the grounds that American Indians were members of quasi-indepen-
dent polities (shown both by the then-practice of the United States of en-
tering into treaties with the tribes and the exemption of American Indians
from taxation by the state and federal governments) and therefore were
not, strictly speaking, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States de-
spite birth in the United States.54  The conclusion was reinforced by legis-
lation enacted contemporaneously with the Fourteenth Amendment that
treated American Indians as non-citizens.55  Nearly forty years later, Amer-
ican Indians were granted U.S. Citizenship by statute.56
The Court emphatically rejected the application of this argument to
the children of unnaturalized residents of the United States in United States
51. See id. at 171 (“[S]uch an interpretation would render the entire ‘subject
to the jurisdiction’ clause almost entirely redundant . . . .”); see also Robert E. Men-
sel, Jurisdiction in Nineteenth Century International Law and Its Meaning in the Citizen-
ship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 331 (2013);
Rogers M. Smith, Birthright Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and
2008, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1329 (2009); William M. Stevens, Comment, Jurisdic-
tion, Allegiance, and Consent: Revisiting the Forgotten Prong of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Birthright Citizenship Clause in Light of Terrorism, Unprecedented Modern Population Mi-
grations, Globalization, and Conflicting Cultures, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 337,
366–68 (2008).
52. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874).  I will have more to say of this
decision in Part V of this Article.
53. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
54. See id. at 102–03.  For analyses of Elk, see Duggin & Collins, supra note 48,
at 100–02; Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment and Native American Citizenship,
17 CONST. COMMENT. 555, 570–71 (2000); Anna Williams Shavers, A Century of De-
veloping Citizenship Law and the Nebraska Influence: A Centennial Essay, 70 NEB. L. REV.
462, 480–86 (1991); Gerald Torres, Social Movements and the Ethical Construction of
Law, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 535, 562–69 (2009) (footnote in title omitted); Leti Volpp,
The Indigenous as Alien, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 289 (2015).
55. See Elk, 112 U.S. at 103–06.  Two Justices dissented, taking issue with the
Court’s reading of the relevant national and legislative histories. See id. at 110–23
(Harlan & Woods, JJ., dissenting).
56. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 68 Stat. 253 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (2012)); see also Goodluck v. Apache Cnty., 417 F. Supp. 13 (D. Ariz.
1975), aff’d mem., 429 U.S. 876 (1976).
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v. Wong Kim Ark.57  Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco in 1873 to
parents who were ineligible to become naturalized citizens.58  His parents
were merchants in San Francisco who had retired to China by the time of
the litigation.59  The Court ignored the fact that his parents at all times
had been ineligible to naturalize and indicated expressly that the Chinese
Exclusion Act, in force from 1882, was irrelevant to Mr. Wong’s status.60
In 1895, after Wong visited China for about a year, he sought to return to
San Francisco.61  At no time did Wong or his parents renounce any claim
he might have had to U.S. citizenship.62  When the authorities sought to
exclude him on the grounds that he was ineligible for citizenship, he ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court.  The Court held that, absent the special
jurisdictional considerations (as in Elk), all persons of all races were in-
cluded within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause.63
One last set of cases remained in the delineation of the Citizenship
Clause’s reach.  When, after the Spanish–American War, the United States
first acquired colonies (lands not intended to become states), the question
57. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).  For a modern claim that this argument should apply
to the children of unnaturalized residents of the United States, see Eastman, supra
note 50.
58. The earliest Naturalization Act (of 1790) and all subsequent Naturaliza-
tion Acts limited naturalization to “free white persons.” See Act of Mar. 26, 1790,
ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414, repealed and
superseded by Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566, amended by Act of Apr. 14,
1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153, repealed and superseded by Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7,
16 Stat. 254, 256 (codified at 30 REV. STAT. § 2169)); see also In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas.
223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878).  Apparently, some Chinese immigrants were naturalized
despite the statutory bar. See RENQUI YU, TO SAVE CHINA, TO SAVE OURSELVES: THE
CHINESE HAND LAUNDRY ALLIANCE OF NEW YORK 19 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1992) (re-
porting at least ten Chinese immigrants were naturalized in New York). See gener-
ally John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants
and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights
Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55, 64–66 (1996).
59. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 652.
60. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943,
ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (making it illegal for Chinese to enter or settle in United
States).  For a history of the exclusion of, and discrimination against, Chinese im-
migrants, see Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 653; JOHN S. W. PARK, ELUSIVE CITIZENSHIP:
IMMIGRATION, ASIAN AMERICANS, AND THE PARADOX OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2004); LUCY E.
SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN
IMMIGRATION LAW (1995); Torok, supra note 58; Paul Yin, The Narratives of Chinese-
American Litigation During the Chinese Exclusion Era, 19 ASIAN AM. L.J. 145 (2012).
61. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 652–53.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 682, 693, 704–05 (distinguishing Elk); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 211 n.10 (1982) (dictum); Kendall, supra note 14, at 356–59; Bernadette
Meyler, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868–1898 States’ Rights, the Law of Na-
tions, and Mutual Consent, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 519 (2001); Leti Volpp, “Obnoxious
to Their Very Nature”: Asian Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71
(2001) (footnote in title omitted).  An earlier lower court opinion had reached the
same conclusion. See In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
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arose of whether the Constitution, including the Citizenship Clause, ap-
plied in these lands.  The Court held, in a series of cases, that newly ac-
quired lands were not subject to the full force of the Constitution unless
Congress chose to “incorporate” those territories into the United States.64
Therefore, the residents of certain “unincorporated territories,” (Guam,
the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) did not be-
come citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment, although the residents
of all of these lands are citizens by statute.65  Persons born in the Ameri-
can Samoa, the Canal Zone, Guantanamo, the Philippines, and the other
Central Pacific Islands (under U.S. administration after World War II)
were never made citizens by statute.66
The Court has had no occasion to revisit the basic conclusion from
these cases that all persons born in “incorporated territories” of the
United States are citizens of the United States unless they were, in some
64. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904); Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244, 282 (1901); see also Haw. v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Armstrong v.
United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901);
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).  Collectively, these decisions are called The
Insular Cases because the lands involved were all islands acquired by the United
States in 1898 or 1899. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756–57 (2008).
The premise of The Insular Cases was reaffirmed as recently as 1979 in Torres v.
Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979). See generally Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto
Rico, Status, and Constitutional Change, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1181 (2014).  For an argu-
ment that Puerto Rico is now an “incorporated territory,” see Willie Santana, Stu-
dent Showcase Article, Incorporating the Lonely Star: How Puerto Rico Became
Incorporated and Earned a Place in the Sisterhood of States, 9 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 433
(2014).  Curiously, the District of Columbia would appear to be an unincorporated
territory given that it was never intended to become a state, although that question
has in fact never been litigated. See Duggin & Collins, supra note 48, at 96–98.
65. See 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2012) (Puerto Rico; U.S. citizens as of 1941); id.
§ 1406 (Virgin Islands; U.S. citizens as of 1927); id. § 1407 (Guam; U.S. citizens as
of 1950); 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012) (Northern Marianas, U.S. citizens as of 1986); see
also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300
(D.C.C. 2015) (American Samoa), petition for cert. docketed by 84 U.S.L.W. 3434 (Feb.
1, 2016) (No. 15-981); Erman, supra note 64; Ediberto Roma´n, The Alien–Citizen
Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1998);
Ediberto Roma´n & Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and Subjuga-
tion Under United States Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437 (2002).  This would
no longer be true if Puerto Rico were held to be an “incorporated territory.” See
Santana, supra note 64.
66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1403 (2012) (extending U.S. citizenship to persons born in
Canal Zone only if at least one parent was U.S. citizen); see also DANIEL LEVY, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK § 2.21 (Charles Roth ed., 2015)
(Central Pacific Islands); id. § 2.22 (the Canal Zone); id. § 2.23 (Philippines).
American Samoans have a special status as non-citizen “U.S. nationals.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1408 (2012); Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 300; Christina Duffy Burnett, “They Say I
Am Not an American . . .”: The Noncitizen National and the Law of American Empire, 48
VA. J. INT’L L. 659 (2008); Adam Clanton, Born to Run: Can an American Samoan
Become President?, 29 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 135 (2012); Duggin & Collins, supra
note 48, at 92–96; Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American Samoa and the
Last U.S. Nationals, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71 (2013).
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sense, born outside the jurisdiction of the United States.67  Nor was the
question much debated among legal scholars, hardly a surprise given that
the rule of jus solis (by right of the soil) has traditionally been the primary
basis of citizenship under the common law.68  The contrary rule of jus
sanguinis (by right of blood) is traditionally followed in the civil law tradi-
tion, but is a secondary rule in the common law tradition.69  The roots of
this difference are lost in the Middle Ages.70  The Court explored these
patterns at great length in the nineteenth-century cases interpreting the
Citizenship Clause.71  To many, the idea of inheriting one’s affiliation with
a political community from one’s parents might seem natural, but is it
more natural than the concept that one’s true affinities attach to the com-
munity in which one is raised, whose language and culture one imbibes
from birth?72  While neither conclusion is absolutely true in all cases, the
American experience particularly lends itself to the latter view—the jus
solis approach to citizenship.73
The economic slowdown of the 1970s and 1980s led to growing con-
cern about the large and increasing numbers of undocumented migrants
in the United States.74  Therefore, some scholars searched for a rationale
67. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94 (1884).
68. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655–58 (citing English cases); see also DICEY’S
CONFLICT OF LAWS 173–77 (J.H.C. Morris et al. eds., Stevens & Sons Ltd. 7th ed.
1958) (1896); Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J.
545, 546 (1921).
69. See DORA KOSTAKOPOULOU, THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF CITIZENSHIP
26–27 (2008); Flournoy, supra note 68, at 546; see also Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S.
815, 834–35 (1971) (holding citizenship of persons born abroad to American par-
ent is not protected by Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying
U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 237, 249 (1994) (describing jus
sanguinis as “hard to justify” in terms of American political theory).  Some com-
mon law jurisdictions have recently abandoned jus soli in favor of jus sanguinis, at
least in restricting citizenship to persons born in the country to persons one of
whose parents was already a citizen or whose parents had resided in the country for
some specified period of years. See, e.g., Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004
(Act No. 38/2004) (Ir.); Citizenship Act 1997 (N.Z.); British Nationality Act, 1981,
c. 61, § 1 (U.K.); see also Kendall, supra note 14, at 360–64.
70. The earliest extant expression of the jus solis rule in English law appears to
be a statute from the reign of Edward III that was designed to extend citizenship
rights to persons born outside of England. See 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1350) (Eng.); see
also Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 ENG. REP. 377 (K.B.); Polly J. Price, Natural Law and
Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73 (1997).
71. See, e.g., Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655–75 (1898).
72. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1471, 1494–97 (1986).
73. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 69, at 249; Ronald D. Rotunda, Birthright Citi-




74. See PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 72 (1998) (contending there was “tidal wave” of ille-
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to deny birthright citizenship to the children of undocumented mi-
grants.75  Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith published the first major effort
to justify a variant reading of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment about twenty-five years before the advent of the TEA Party.76
They argued that membership in a political community depended upon
mutual consent, both of those who wanted to become members and of the
existing members of the community.77  They then reasoned that undocu-
mented migrants, not having received consent to be present in the politi-
cal community, could only claim citizenship for their children born in the
United States if Congress were to confer citizenship on them by statute.78
They argued that the requirement in the Fourteenth Amendment that the
children be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States must exclude
children born to undocumented migrants.79  They dismissed Wong Kim
Ark by asserting that the Court had only assumed that Wong was a citizen
and had not found him to be a citizen, ignoring the clear holding of the
case.80  They would analogize the status of the children of undocumented
migrants to the status of American Indians—who were members of semi-
independent political communities within the confines of the nation.81
gal immigrants eroding “community, self-definition, national autonomy, and social
justice,” diminishing national legitimacy, and producing “a profound, perhaps ir-
retrievable loss”); see also Peter H. Schuck, The Meaning of American Citizenship in a
Post-9/11 World, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531 (2007); Peter H. Schuck, Whose Member-
ship Is It, Anyway? Comments on Gerald Neuman, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 321 (1994).  Others
have taken up the cry. See, e.g., Tyler Grant, Note, Made in America: Medical Tourism
and Birth Tourism Leading to a Larger Base of Transient Citizenship, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 159 (2015).  For doubts about such hyperbolic assertions, see Ediberto Ro-
ma´n, The Alien Invasion?, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 841 (2008).  Estimates of the number of
such births vary widely but seem to have fallen sharply in recent years, if only be-
cause of the economic crisis. See Josh Barro, Just What Do You Mean by ‘Anchor
Baby’?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2015, at SR3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/30/upshot/just-what-do-you-mean-by-anchor-baby.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/H3R5-EL99]; Julia Preston, Births to Undocumented Parents Decline, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2015, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/
us/births-to-undocumented-parents-decline.html [https://perma.cc/8EV9-HY28].
75. Proposals to curtail birthright citizenship had begun as early as the late
nineteenth century, but largely faded from view in the twentieth century. See gener-
ally Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Policing the Borders of Birthright Citizenship: Some Thoughts
on the New (and Old) Restrictionism, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 311 (2012).
76. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985).
77. See id. at 3–4, 122.
78. See id. at 5–7, 116.  Rogers Smith would later conclude that the consistent
congressional rejection of bills to deprive children of undocumented migrants of
birthright citizenship constitutes consent by society to such citizenship. See Smith,
supra note 51, at 1332–33.
79. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 76, at 76, 79–83, 119–20.
80. See id. at 102–03, 117; see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
693, 704–05 (1898).
81. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 76, at 63–66, 83 (relying on Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94 (1884)); see also Torres, supra note 54.
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This was a status that presumably Schuck and Smith did not want to ac-
cord to undocumented migrants and their children.
Schuck and Smith’s argument from a theory of mutual consent not
only flatly contradicts settled case law interpreting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Citizenship Clause, but also fails to provide a coherent explanation
of a just theory of citizenship.82  For example, it justifies the exclusion of
any disfavored minority from birthright citizenship, including American
Indians whose presence antedates European settlement.83  It would even
justify Dred Scott in excluding persons of African ancestry, some of whose
ancestors have been in the country since 1619 (twelve years after the first
permanent English settlement at Jamestown).84  Yet the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to overrule Dred Scott, not “to create a new class
82. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 76, at 119.  Schuck and Smith acknowl-
edge this fact. See also Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1989); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 54, 66–71 (1997); Allen R. Kamp, The Birthright Citizenship Contro-
versy: A Study of Conservative Substance and Rhetoric, 18 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 49
(2012); Gerard N. Magliocca, Indians and Invaders: The Citizenship Clause and Illegal
Aliens, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 499 (2008); D. Carolina Nu´n˜ez, Beyond Blood and
Borders: Finding Meaning in Birthright Citizenship, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 835 (2013);
David S. Schwartz, The Amorality of Consent, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2143 (1986) (review-
ing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 76).
83. See Wilkins, 112 U.S. at 94; see also Kristin Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus
Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE
L.J. 2134 (2014); Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History,
Evolution, and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 667 (1995); Eisgruber, supra note 82, at 59–61, 62–66, 72–85; Mary D. Fan,
Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-”Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding
Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905 (2011); Jennifer
Gordon & R. A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and
Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493 (2007); Saby Ghoshray, Rescuing the Citi-
zenship Clause from Nativistic Distortion: A Reconstructionist Interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 261 (2012); Priscilla Huang, Anchor Babies,
Over-Breeders, and the Population Bomb: The Reemergence of Nativism and Population Con-
trol in Anti-Immigration Policies, 2 HARV. L. POL’Y REV. 385 (2008); Kendall, supra
note 14, at 376–81; Neuman, supra note 69, at 248–49; Mae M. Ngai, Birthright
Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2007); Roma´n & Sim-
mons, supra note 67; Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigra-
tion Law: Citizenship and Race After September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871 (2003);
Allison S. Hartry, Student Article, Birthright Justice: The Attack on Birthright Citizenship
and Immigrant Women of Color, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 57 (2012); Note,
The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A Threat to Equality, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1026
(1994); Symposium, Citizenship and Its Discontents: Centering the Immigrant in the In-
ter/National Imagination (Part I), 76 OR. L. REV. 207 (1997).
84. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Eisgruber, supra note 82, at 61–62;
Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485 (1987) (review-
ing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 76); see also John Thornton, The African Experience
of the “20. and Odd Negroes” Arriving in Virginia in 1619, 55 WM. & MARY Q. 421
(1998).
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss3/8
2016] CONSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP UNDER ATTACK 493
of persons who had no rights a citizen is bound to respect[.]”85  To con-
clude that Congress can exclude disfavored groups from citizenship even
though they are born in the United States is to invite the creation of a
permanent underclass of non-citizen residents, as are found in some for-
eign countries.86
Despite its analytical weakness, the Schuck and Smith thesis has con-
siderable support from persons opposed to recognizing birthright citizen-
ship for children of undocumented migrants.87  Bills periodically
introduced in Congress to enact this theory fail to pass.88  Such arguments
were revived during the intellectual ferment generated by the TEA Party.
Lino Graglia additionally argued that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment could not have intended to confer citizenship on the chil-
dren of undocumented migrants because there were no restrictions on
immigration in 1868 when the amendment was ratified.89  But there were
illegal or undocumented migrants in the United States in 1868, although
usually they were “illegal” under state law rather than federal law.90
The TEA Partiers’ efforts to restrict birthright citizenship seem un-
likely to succeed91—although that could change after the 2016 election.
Such a statute, if enacted, would seem clearly to be unconstitutional given
both the rather clear text on point and the precedents construing that
text.  Proponents of restricting birthright citizenship have resorted instead
to steps at the state level in order to frustrate the rights of infant citizens
whom they don’t want to be citizens.  The steps range from making it diffi-
cult or impossible for the infants to obtain birth certificates to prove they
are citizens, to attempts to define state (as opposed to federal) citizenship
more restrictively than it is defined in the Fourteenth Amendment, to at-
tempts to enter into an interstate compact that would effectively redefine
85. Epps, supra note 49, at 372; see also Geoffrey A. Hoffman & Susham M.
Modi, The War on Terror as a Metaphor for Immigration Regulation: A Critical View of a
Distorted Debate, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 449, 466 (2012).
86. See Kendall, supra note 14, at 376–78.
87. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 104–06 (1988); Pat-
rick J. Charles, Decoding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause: Unlawful Immi-
grants, Allegiance, Personal Subjection, and the Law, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 211 (2012);
Matthew Lister, Citizenship, in the Immigration Context, 70 MD. L. REV. 175 (2010);
William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 221 (2008); Stevens, supra note 51.
88. See the authorities collected supra at note 13.  Did the failure to pass such
bills mean that society consented to extending birthright citizenship to the chil-
dren of undocumented migrants? See Smith, supra note 51, at 1332.
89. See Lino Graglia, Birthright Citizenship for Children of Illegal Aliens: An Irra-
tional Public Policy, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 5–6 (2009).
90. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993); see also Epps, supra note 49, at
382–87.  Under federal law, naturalization (but not immigration) in 1868 was lim-
ited to “free white persons.” See the authorities collected supra at note 54.
91. Consider the large number of proposed bills, collected supra note 13, all
of which failed to enact. See Smith, supra note 51, at 1332–33.
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citizenship notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment.92  Just as other
state initiatives attempting to exclude undocumented migrants have been
preempted by the federal authority over immigration, so too should these
mean-spirited efforts to punish children for the sins of their parents.93
Fears that some parents have babies in the United States to ensure their
ability to reenter the country as terrorists twenty or more years after their
birth (terror babies) are too farfetched to merit serious discussion.94
IV. REVOKING CITIZENSHIP
Another proposal popular among TEA Partiers is to strip U.S. citizen-
ship from those who provide material support for terrorism—although
presumably they would not apply this rule against wholly domestic, right-
wing terrorists.95  This proposal suggests just how far the opinion of some
Americans has changed from what was the traditional approach in the
United States.  From the beginning of the United States, and for more
than a century afterwards, the American government was concerned about
the right of aliens to abandon their foreign citizenship and take up a natu-
ralized American citizenship.  This concern became a prime cause of the
92. See, e.g., Kendall, supra note 14, at 368–70; Associated Press, Texas: No
Quick Ruling in Quest for Birth Certificates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2015, at A16, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/17/us/texas-no-quick-ruling-in-quest-for-
birth-certificates.html [https://perma.cc/YC4X-DAD4]; Manny Fernandez, Immi-
grants Fight Texas’ Birth Certificate Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/us/illegal-immigrant-birth-certificates.html
[https://perma.cc/3SC3-KGQ2].  One effect of denying a birth certificate would
be to prevent these infants from voting when they obtain the legal age to vote. See
Julie Bosman, Vote ID Battle Shifts to Kansas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2015, at A1, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/us/politics/kansas-voter-id-law-sets-
off-a-new-battle-over-registration.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=42AD7744B
B4D2832ABD6E533BF65500C&gwt=pay [https://perma.cc/76UG-RRCV]; see also
Shankar Vedantam, State Lawmakers Taking Aim at Amendment Granting Birthright
Citizenship, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 255448.
93. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014); United
States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2022
(2013); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–20 (1982); Epps, supra note 49, at
371; Hoffman & Modi, supra note 85, at 461; Robert F. Ley, Are We Punishing “Illegal
Citizen” Children to Deter Parents? Critiquing Birthright Citizenship Through the Citizens-
Benefits Question and Citizenship Reductionism, 33 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 23 (2014).
94. See, e.g., Hoffman & Modi, supra note 85, at 461–63; Anderson Cooper Stuns
GOP Rep. on ‘Terror Babies’: ‘They Did Not Tell Me You Were Going to Grill Me’ (VIDEO),
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2010), www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/11/ander-
son-cooper-stuns-gop_n_678650.html [https://perma.cc/JQE8-XAKC].
95. See the authorities collected supra at note 11.  Of course, such arguments
did not originate with the TEA Party, and in fact had figured prominently in public
debate nearly a decade before the advent of the TEA Party. See J.M. Spectar, To
Ban or Not to Ban an American Taliban? Revocation of Citizenship & Statelessness in a
Statecentric System, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 263 (2003); see also Charles Kurzman & David
Schanzer, The Growing Right-Wing Terror Threat, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2015, at A27;
Scott Shane, Homegrown Extremists Tied to Deadlier Toll Than Jihadists in U.S. Since 9/
11, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2015, at A1.
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss3/8
2016] CONSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP UNDER ATTACK 495
War of 1812.96  Congress eventually codified the right of voluntary expatri-
ation in the Expatriation Act of 1868, which declared “the right of expatri-
ation is a natural and inherent right of all people” and forbade any
government agency from interfering in any way with this right.97
With World War II pending and the United States becoming a global
actor, the American approach to expatriation changed.  The Expatriation
Act of 1868 was carried forward into the Nationality Act of 1940, but that
statute also included elaborate provisions to strip persons of citizenship if
they committed a prohibited or “denationalizing” act.98  There were eight
(later nine) acts that automatically caused loss of citizenship.99  They
included:
Naturalization in another state;
Taking an oath or affirming allegiance to another state;
Serving in a foreign military;
Serving in any office that requires foreign citizenship;
Voting in a foreign political election;
Formally renouncing US citizenship;
Conviction by a court martial of desertion during time of war;
Committing treason; and
Departing from or remaining outside the country during time of
war to avoid military service.100
This list is one that, with the addition of support for terrorist acts
against the United States, many TEA Partiers could support.  The idea that
committing most of these acts exhibits such a level of disloyalty to the
United States that the actor deserves to lose her citizenship has appeal.
Yet ignored in such a policy is that for treason, at least, automatic revoca-
tion of citizenship might preclude a finding of guilt.101  Treason can be
96. See ALAN TAYLOR, THE CIVIL WAR OF 1812: AMERICAN CITIZENS, BRITISH
SUBJECTS, IRISH REBELS, & INDIAN ALLIES (2010).
97. See 15 Stat. 223 (codified at 25 REV. STAT. § 1999).
98. See 8 U.S.C. § 800 (2012).  While not explicitly repealed, this provision was
not carried forward into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. See generally
Alan G. James, Expatriation in the United States: Precept and Practice Today and Yester-
day, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 853, 861–67 (1990).  The Expatriation Act of 1907, Pub.
L. No. 59-193, 34 Stat. 1228, had provided for expatriation, but only for swearing
allegiance to a foreign sovereign. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) (up-
holding denationalization of woman who became foreign citizen upon marriage to
foreign citizen).
99. See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-853, § 401, 54 Stat. 1137, 1168–69
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2012)); see also James, supra note 98, at 371–76.
100. Act of Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 418, 58 Stat. 746.
101. See Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. (Dall.) 53, 58–59 (Pa. 1781) (holding
defendant who left state before effective date of state’s treason act in order to
support King against revolution was not chargeable with treason); see also Kawakita
v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 723–30 (1952) (rejecting factual claim that defen-
dant renounced citizenship before committing treasonous acts). See generally Carl-
ton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant
Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 878–82 (2006); Ashwini Vasanthakumar, Treason,
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committed by resident aliens, so perhaps revocation of citizenship would
not affect guilt for some treasons.102  Whether supporting terrorism
against the United States would be treason is not entirely clear, but the
crime of providing material support for terrorism does not turn on
whether the culprit is an American citizen.103
The constitutionality of legislatively revoking citizenship for the doing
of these or other acts has been fully litigated.  The Supreme Court consid-
ered the matter directly on two separate occasions.  In the first decision,
Perez v. Brownell,104 the Court held, in a 5–4 decision, that Congress, in
regulating foreign affairs, had the power to impose denationalization for
doing certain acts regardless of whether the actor intended to renounce
her citizenship.  Clemente Perez, a citizen by birth in Texas, was denation-
alized for voting in a Mexican election.105  The Court limited congres-
sional power by requiring that the act in question tend to embarrass the
conduct of foreign relations.106  In a decision announced along with Perez,
the Court struck down a specific denationalization provision, holding that
wartime desertion was unlikely to affect foreign relations.107
Finally, in Afroyim v. Rusk,108 the Court overruled Perez in another 5–4
decision, only nine years after Perez was decided.  Beys Afroyim, a natural-
ized citizen, faced denationalization for voting in an Israeli election.109
The majority held that Congress had no authority to strip a citizen of her
citizenship, and the only way such a person could lose her citizenship was
by voluntary renunciation.110  Justice Hugo Black wrote the following pas-
sage on behalf of the majority, which could explain why Congress lacks the
Expatriation and ‘So-Called’ Americans: Recovering the Role of Allegiance in Citizenship, 12
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 201–12 (2014).
102. See Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147, 155–56 (1872); see also Larson,
supra note 101, at 891–94.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).  For an extended meditation on this point,
see Jaykant M. Patidar, Note, Citizenship and the Treatment of American Citizen Ter-
rorists in the United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 805 (2004) and Larson, supra note 101, at
900–26.
104. 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967); see Dellapenna, supra note 1, at 533–35; Vasanthakumar, supra note 101, at
215–18.
105. See Perez, 356 U.S. at 60–61.  He was also alleged to have remained
outside the U.S. to evade military service during World War II, but the Court de-
clined to consider this point. See id. at 62.
106. See id. at 60.
107. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); see also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163 (1964) (striking down return of naturalized citizen to state of birth citizen-
ship); Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (striking down grounds
of departing or remaining outside United States to evade military service).  In an-
other companion case, the Court found a failure to prove a voluntary expatriation.
See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
108. 387 U.S. 253 (1967); see also Dellapenna, supra note 1, at 535–38.
109. See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 254.
110. See id. at 257, 268.
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss3/8
2016] CONSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP UNDER ATTACK 497
power to pick and choose which infants born in the United States become
citizens:
Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Con-
gress decides to do so under the name of one of its general or
implied grants of power . . . .  [The Nation’s] citizenry is the
country and the country is its citizenry.  The very nature of our
free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule
of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can
deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship.  We hold
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, pro-
tect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible
destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race.
Our holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which
is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free
country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.111
With two contrary decisions from a nearly evenly divided court riven
by intense disagreement, one might have expected the Court to revisit
denationalization when the opportunity arose.  It did not.  Some argued
that the holding in Afroyim should be limited strictly to the “voting in a
foreign political election” clause, a position expressly rejected by the U.S.
Attorney General.112  When Congress amended the denationalization stat-
ute, supposedly to conform to the holding of Afroyim, it merely deleted
111. Id. at 267–68.  Some other common law countries, not being constrained
by a constitutional guarantee of citizenship, have enacted citizenship-stripping
laws. See, e.g., Immigration, Asylum & Nationality Act, 2006, c. 13 (U.K.); Audrey
Macklin, Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the
Alien, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 1 (2014); see also Stewart Bell, Ottawa Plans to Strip More Ter-
rorists of Citizenship, VANCOUVER SUN (Can.), Oct. 1, 2015, at B3, available at http://
www.pressreader.com/canada/the-vancouver-sun/20151001/281805692744195/
TextView; Simon Benson, New Plan to Deport Terrorists, HERALD SUN (Sydney,
Austl.), Sept. 4, 2015, at 4; Bill Boosting Powers to Deny Citizenship May Breach Interna-
tional Law, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 11, 2015, available at 2015 WLNR 4226880; Jo-
seph Brean, Citizenship—and Its Revocation—Emerges as a Major Theme in Election
Campaign, WINDSOR STAR (Can.), Oct. 3, 2015, at A12; Jim Bronskill, Terrorist Cites
Right to Vote in Move to Save Citizenship, TORONTO STAR (Can.), Oct. 15, 2015, at A10;
David Crowe, Bipartisan Backing Adds Weight to Citizenship Laws, AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 5,
2015, at 2, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/biparti-
san-backing-adds-weight-to-citizenship-laws/news-story/7aa82b56d9959e4cceb639
e9ccf99f86; Kareem Fahim, Kuwait, Fighting Dissent from Within, Revokes Citizenship,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2014, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/
01/world/middleeast/kuwait-fighting-dissent-from-within-uses-citizenship-as-a-
weapon-.html [https://perma.cc/SL8S-LPTK]; Thomas Walkom, Tories Get Creative
with New Power to Strip Citizenship, TORONTO STAR (Can.), Oct. 3, 2015, at A9; David
Wroe, Your Citizenship Stripped for Graffiti?, AGE (Austl.), June 25, 2015, at 6.
112. See, e.g., 42 OP. ATT’Y GEN. no. 34 (Jan. 18, 1969); WILLIAM W. BISHOP,
JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 527 n.88 (3d ed. 1971); see also
United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 813 (2d Cir. 1976); Rocha v. INS, 450
F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1971); Peter v. Sec’y of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972).
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from the list of denationalizing acts the specific acts that had actually been
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.113
Despite the political resistance, in two decisions within fifteen years
after Afroyim, the Court unanimously endorsed the premise that no one
can be deprived of citizenship without that person’s consent, on any
grounds, and elucidated some important aspects of the principle.114  In
the first case, Rogers v. Bellei,115 the Court clarified constitutional citizen-
ship.  Aldo Mario Bellei was born in Italy in 1939 to an Italian father and
an American mother, therefore acquiring both Italian and American citi-
zenship at birth.116  United States law at the time in question, however,
provided that a person such as Bellei lost his citizenship if he failed to live
within the United States for five consecutive years between the ages of
fourteen and twenty-eight—something Bellei did not do.117  The majority,
in another 5–4 decision, concluded that Bellei was neither born nor natu-
ralized in the United States but had been naturalized at birth outside the
United States; as such, his citizenship was not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.118  The four dissenters agreed that Bellei was a naturalized
citizen but argued that the physical location of the naturalization did not
determine whether Congress has the power to revoke his citizenship.119
The majority analogized people like Bellei to Native Americans and re-
sidents of unincorporated territories—other persons whose citizenship is
not based on the Fourteenth Amendment.120
A decade later, in Vance v. Terrazas,121 the Court confronted burdens
of proof regarding renunciation, without casting doubt on the proposition
that Congress may not impose denationalization on a citizen born or natu-
ralized “in the United States.”122  Laurence Terrazas was born in Texas as
a Mexican–U.S. dual national; but when he was a student in Mexico, at age
113. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2012) (omitting wartime desertion, voting in foreign
political elections, returning to birth land, and evading military service).
114. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 259–62 (1980); Rogers v. Bellei, 401
U.S. 815, 827–28 (1971).
115. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
116. See id. at 817–19.
117. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012).
118. See Bellei, 401 U.S. at 822–23, 827, 835; see also id. at 838–39 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (noting Bellei was neither born nor naturalized in United States);
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898) (“But [the first sentence
of Fourteenth Amendment] has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by be-
ing born abroad of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as
it had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred by the
[C]onstitution to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.”).  At least one scholar
has named citizenship through naturalization at birth as “acquired citizenship.”
See Lee J. Tera´n, Mexican Children of U.S. Citizens: “Viges Prin” and Other Tales of
Challenges to Asserting Acquired U.S. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR 583 (2012).
119. See Bellei, 401 U.S. at 842–43 (Black, Douglas & Marshall, JJJ., dissenting);
accord id. at 845 (Brennan & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
120. See supra notes 53–56, 77–80 and accompanying text.
121. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
122. See id. at 259.
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twenty-two, he swore allegiance to Mexico and renounced his U.S. citizen-
ship in order to obtain a certificate of Mexican nationality.123  He admit-
ted that he took the oath voluntarily, but he denied any actual intent to
renounce his U.S. citizenship.124  The Court held that the government
had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a
citizen specifically intended to renounce her citizenship, even when doing
a “denationalizing” act.125  The Court upheld the statutory presumption
that the act had been done voluntarily but rejected any presumption that
the doing of the act was meant as a renunciation of citizenship.126  The
Court also rejected the notion, embraced by some in dissent, that the re-
nunciation of citizenship must follow some prescribed formality.127  If the
requisite intent is found, even if it is not explicit, the renunciation is
effective.128
The effect of these cases is clear.  For a small percentage of American
citizens—those whose citizenship was not acquired under the Fourteenth
Amendment (Native Americans, persons born in unincorporated territo-
ries, and persons naturalized at birth outside the United States)—citizen-
ship can be terminated by a simple act of Congress, even against their
will.129  For those citizens who obtained their citizenship under the Four-
teenth Amendment either by birth in the United States or by naturaliza-
tion in the United States (and in either case, subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States), the only way they can lose their citizenship is to volun-
tarily renounce it.130  For citizens naturalized in the United States, there is
an “exception”—if they obtained their naturalization “illegally,” a court
can void the naturalization.131  This does not really contradict the general
rule because such persons were never validly citizens.
In 1990, the State Department adopted a much more favorable ap-
proach to the preservation of citizenship, adopting the view that one gives
it up only by formally renouncing it, or by doing a denationalizing act, or
otherwise behaving in a way utterly inconsistent with an intent to remain a
citizen.132  After September 11, 2001, congressional support for a dena-
123. See id. at 255–56.
124. See id. at 256.
125. See id. at 260–63.
126. See id. at 266–70 (upholding 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (2012)); see also James,
supra note 98, at 886–95; Peter J. Spiro, Expatriating Terrorists, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2169, 2174–76 (2014); Vasanthakumar, supra note 101, at 218–22.
127. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 274–76 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).  One Justice dissented on the burden of proof, wanting a clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard. See id. at 272–74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 261–63; see also Dellapenna, supra note 1, at 538–51.
129. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971); see also Dellapenna, supra note
1, at 552.
130. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
131. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1980); see also Bryan Den-
son, Imam’s Citizenship Case Is Rare, Lawyers Say, OREGONIAN, July 23, 2015, at A2.
132. See James, supra note 98, at 895–96.
23
Dellapenna: Constitutional Citizenship Under Attack
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
500 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 477
tionalization statute was almost non-existent, whether because of its evi-
dent unconstitutionality or because it would make little practical
difference.133  Still, in at least one case, the government agreed to release
a person from long-term imprisonment only on condition that he re-
nounce his citizenship.134  Whether such a coerced renunciation is valid is
unclear.  Of even more dubious legality is the effective banishment of U.S.
citizens by placing them on a “no-fly” list while they are out of the
country.135
V. NATURAL BORN CITIZENS
The third point where the TEA Partiers have put the Constitution’s
rules about citizenship in play is regarding the qualifications to be Presi-
dent.  The Constitution provides that “No Person except a natural born
Citizen . . . shall be eligible to the Office of President.”136  “Natural born
Citizen” is not defined in the Constitution.  Debate over the interpretation
of this phrase has been complicated by a desire on the part of some simul-
taneously to delegitimize President Obama while legitimizing the right of
Ted Cruz to run for President.137  “Birthers” who espouse such views tie
themselves in knots to justify their conclusions that the requirement that
the President be a “natural born citizen” would preclude Obama (born in
Hawaii) and not Cruz (born in Alberta, Canada).138  Surprisingly, given
the prominence of the “natural born citizen” requirement in the cam-
133. See Spiro, supra note 126.
134. See Saad Gul, Return of the Native? An Assessment of the Citizenship Renuncia-
tion Clause in Hamdi’s Settlement Agreement in the Light of Citizenship Jurisprudence, 27
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 131 (2007); see also Peter J. Spiro, The Boundaries of Cosmopolitan
Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1261 (2005).
135. See Leti Volpp, Citizenship Undone, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2579 (2007).
136. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.  The omitted language refers to persons
who are citizens when “this Constitution” enters into effect.  There are few, if any,
persons to whom this clause could apply currently.
137. Compare Allen, supra note 42, with Jacobson, supra note 43, and
Mataconis, supra note 43.  Some do oppose Cruz as well as Obama. See, e.g., Nel-
son, supra note 43.
138. Compare Certificate of Live Birth: Barack Hussein Obama II, Haw. Dep’t
Health, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20110429013125/http://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/birth-certificate-long-form.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M29X-SLYW], and JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42097, QUALIFICATIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND THE “NATURAL BORN” CITIZENSHIP ELI-
GIBILITY REQUIREMENT 41–42 (Nov. 14, 2011), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R42097.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XNV-J2JB], with Certificate of Birth Rafael
Edward Cruz, Alta. Dep’t Health, available at  http://www.dallasnews.com/incom-
ing/20130818-cruz_0819nat_32638724.jpg.ece/BINARY/w940/CRUZ_0819NAT_
32638724.JPG [https://perma.cc/NMP7-ZLVY].  Some have argued that both par-
ents had to have been citizens when a child was born to be a “natural born citizen.”
See John Ira Jones IV, Note, Natural Born Shenanigans: How the Birther Movement Exac-
erbated Confusion over the Constitution’s Natural Born Citizen Requirement, 27 REGENT U.
L. REV. 155, 177–81 (2014).  This claim is so much without support in the authori-
ties that I dismiss it without discussion, but note that it does not solve Cruz’s prob-
lem, for his father was not a U.S. citizen when he was born.
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paign against Obama, thus far only a few people, including Donald
Trump, have questioned whether Senator Cruz is a “natural born
citizen.”139
To resolve their dilemma, some of the most extreme birthers resort to
an elaborate conspiracy theory, the mere statement of which should be
enough to discredit it.  The theory proposes that Obama was not born in
Hawaii to an American mother, but was born in Kenya to entirely Kenyan
parents, and thereafter smuggled into the United States so that he could,
forty-six years later, be elected President to complete a slow motion
coup.140  That anyone would consider selecting a black, African-born baby
in 1961—when the Civil Rights Movement was just beginning and most
African Americans were kept from voting—as a worthwhile investment of
resources over forty-six years on the off chance that he could be elected
President simply boggles the mind.  After all, what parent not named Bush
would ever pick up a baby and say this one definitely will be President one
day?141  Yet a hard core of 25% of Republicans apparently believe this
story.142  We shall abandon this theory and other factual claims about
where President Obama was born and instead consider just who qualifies
as a “natural born Citizen.”
Many people apparently assume that anyone who acquires U.S. citi-
zenship at birth must be a “natural born Citizen.”143  This was the conclu-
sion that Jack Maskell, an attorney for the Congressional Research Service,
139. See Dan Riehl, Trump Goes ‘Birther’ on Cruz, BREITBART, Mar. 23, 2015,
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/03/23/trump-goes-birther-on-
cruz/ [https://perma.cc/9KFC-965W]; see also Charles Kerchner, The Birthers.org
Website Issues a “Triple Dog Dare” to U.S. Senator Ted Cruz (Oct. 28, 2014), https://
cdrkerchner.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/the-birthers-org-website-issues-a-triple-
dog-dare-to-u-s-senator-ted-cruz/ [https://perma.cc/MPN8-MCP6].
140. See JEROME R. CORSI, WHERE’S THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE: THE CASE THAT
BARACK OBAMA IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO BE PRESIDENT (2011); see also Jones, supra note
138, at 155–58; MASKELL, supra note 138, at 39.
141. See Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) (dismissing
claim that President Obama is not U.S. citizen as frivolous); Berg v. Obama, 586
F.3d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting Berg’s claims had “obvious lack of any
merit”); see also Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1378–80 (M.D. Ga.
2009), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 949 (11th Cir. 2010); Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d
1144 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Ankeny v. Governor, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),
transfer denied, 929 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 2010); MASKELL, supra note 138, at 42–43.
142. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 42; see also Oliver Willis, New Poll: More Than
50% of Iowa Republicans Are Still Birthers, ADDICTING INFO (Sept. 8, 2015), http://
www.addictinginfo.org/2015/09/08/new-poll-more-than-50-of-iowa-republicans-
are-still-birthers/ [https://perma.cc/AM9G-4MGC].
143. See, e.g., Neal Katyal & Paul Clement, On the Meaning of “Natural Born
Citizen,” 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 161 (2015); Christina S. Lohman, Presidential Eligibil-
ity: The Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen Clause, 36 GONZAGA L. REV. 349, 369
(2000); Angie Drobnic Holan, Is Ted Cruz, Born in Canada, Eligible to Run for Presi-
dent?, POLITIFACT (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/arti
cle/2013/aug/20/ted-cruz-born-canada-eligible-run-president/ [https://perma.cc
/7LGS-TV6S]; Jacobson, supra note 43; Dara Lind, Can Canadian-Born Ted Cruz
Run for President? (Yes.), VOX (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/3/23/
8275573/ted-cruz-canada.  This conclusion, even if valid, would not help American
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reached in 2011.144  The question cannot, however, be resolved so easily.
Some prominent commentators have interpreted the phrase as requiring
that a President must be “native-born”—i.e., that the President must have
been born in the United States.145  The Supreme Court has also equated
“natural born” with “native born” in at least two decisions.146  Just because
there is no definitive Supreme Court decision on the meaning of “natural
born citizen” as a qualification for serving as President does not mean
there are no sources to allow us to determine the legal meaning of this
term.147
The requirement that a President be a “natural born Citizen” was ad-
ded to the Constitution at the very end of the drafting process in 1787,
with no recorded discussion or debate.148  Nor is there any clear indica-
tion of what most people would have thought the phrase meant at the
time, making recovery of the original meaning uncertain.  Apparently, the
requirement was added to ensure that only persons of unquestioned at-
tachment to the United States could ever be commander-in-chief.149
Some then feared that a foreign agent might become President and sub-
Samoans who are born in an unincorporated territory and, as such, become Amer-
ican nationals at birth but not American citizens. See Clanton, supra note 66.
144. See MASKELL, supra note 138.
145. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES AND
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, App. at 323 (William
Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803).  The phrase “native born” does not appear
in the Constitution or federal statutes, but its meaning is limited to persons born
in the United States. See 7 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-
LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 91.02[4][a] (rev. ed. 2010).
146. See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1963); United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623–24 (1931).
147. See Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, 586 F.3d
234 (3d Cir. 2009); Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.N.H. 2008); see also Clanton, supra
note 66, at 159–73; Duggin & Collins, supra note 48, at 108–34; Jones, supra note
138, at 167–77.  The lack of a Supreme Court decision on the requirement that the
President be a “natural born” citizen is hardly surprising.  The question could not
arise in court unless a person born outside the United States were to be on the
ballot for President, a rare event, and then a complainant would have to find a
procedural route to raise the question.  Ordinary voters would probably lack stand-
ing.  Conceivably, a state official in charge of conducting an election could sue to
bar the appearance of such a candidate on the ballot or simply order the removal
of the candidate’s name and leave it to the candidate to sue.
148. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 366–67, 376, 473, 493–94, 498, 574, 578 (1911); see also Duggin & Collins, supra
note 48, at 63–68.
149. See Letter from John Jay to George Washington, in, 4 DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 237; see also Clement & Katyal, supra note 143, at 163;
Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Ap-
proach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 888–89
(1988); Seymore, supra note 14, at 937–41.
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vert the nation.150  (This brings to mind the extreme conspiracy theories
against President Obama.)  Apparently, the drafters of the Constitution
thought the meaning of “natural born citizen” was clear enough that it
needed neither explanation nor definition.  In such a case, the courts will
refer to the English common law of the time to determine the meaning of
the term.151
The meaning of a “natural born citizen” under English law in 1787 is
not entirely clear.  At the least, it meant that any person born on English
soil (jus soli) was a “natural born subject of the crown” (and inferentially, a
citizen of a pertinent North American colony).152  An English statute from
1350 provided for citizenship at birth for the children of English subjects
born abroad.153  These statutes were applied in the colonies, although
whether this could be considered part of the common law for the former
colonies in 1787 is far from clear.154  The Supreme Court in 1898 did not
think this made them “natural born citizens.”155  However, Blackstone
(writing not about the Constitution, but about English law) did think
so.156  Madison, the reputed “Father of the Constitution,” explained in
Congress in 1789 that “place is the most certain criterion; it is what applies
in the United States . . . .”157
Congress, exercising its power to enact a uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion, enacted a statute in 1790 to provide that “the children of citizens of
the United States, that may be born beyond the sea, or out of the limits of
the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens,” at least if
150. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 148, at 216, 235, 268 (discussing whether citi-
zenship requirement should be imposed on all Senators and Representatives); see
also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 164–65 (2005); 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1473,
332–33 (1833); Duggin & Collins, supra note 48, at 69–70.
151. See, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521 (2000); Ex parte Grossman,
267 U.S. 87, 108–09 (1925); see also 1 STORY, supra note 150, § 157, at 149.
152. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 658, 661–62 (1898);
Calvin’s Case, (1608) 7 Eng. Rep. 377, 4b-6a, 18a, 18b; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 357–58 (1765).
153. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 152, at 354–58, 361.
154. See SYDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 189 (1897); see also Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., Dual Nationality and
Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1921); Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the
United States: The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1, 12, 18 (1968).
155. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655–71, 693 (1898); see also Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167–68 (1875) (indicating in dictum persons born in
United States are natural-born citizens).
156. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 152, at 361. Note that Blackstone’s conclu-
sion about the meaning of “natural born subject” was “not completely clear or
precise.”  Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 27 (2008).
157. M. ST. CLAIR CLARKE & DAVID A. HALL, CASES ON CONTESTED ELECTIONS
IN CONGRESS FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE 23, 32–35 (1834) (quoting
James Madison, 1 Cong., 1st Sess. (1789)) (commenting on citizenship eligibility
of Rep.-elect William Smith).
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the father had been a resident of the United States.158  Some consider this
to be proof of the “original” meaning of “natural born citizen.”159  The
statute, however, does not indicate that such children are “natural born
citizens,” but only that they are to be “considered” as “natural born citi-
zens”—a peculiar wording if the statute was simply declaring that such
children have always been considered “natural born citizens.”  Instead, it
seems to suggest that without the statute they would not be considered
natural born citizens.  Even if the more inclusive meaning is the correct
reading of the statute, it cannot, of course, alter the constitutional qualifi-
cations for President, although it might be evidence of a contemporary
understanding of the phrase.  The statute, moreover, was named an “Act
to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization,” and therefore, arguably,
whatever right it conferred was as a naturalized citizen.160  In any event, it
was replaced in 1795 with a statute that declared such children to be citi-
zens but omitted the phrase “natural born.”161  That earlier language
never reappeared.  St. George Tucker, writing in 1803, thought that this
was the correction of an erroneous idea in the earlier statute rather than
simply a drafting oversight, reaching the conclusion that the phrase “natu-
ral born citizen” meant “native born”—i.e., born within the United
States.162  Tucker was a judge in Virginia and professor of law at William
and Mary College, as well as the American editor of Blackstone’s Commenta-
ries, a standard reference work in the early nineteenth century.163
The evidence of original meaning is inconclusive at best, although the
authority of James Madison and St. George Tucker provide weighty evi-
dence supporting the view that “natural born” means born in the United
States.164  In interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which came into
158. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104.
159. See Clement & Katyal, supra note 143, at 162; Duggin & Collins, supra
note 48, at 76–78; Gordon, supra note 154, at 10–11; Lohman, supra note 143, at
370–73; MASKELL, supra note 138, at 20–21.
160. See Lawrence Friedman, An Idea Whose Time Has Come–The Curious History,
Uncertain Effect, and Need for Amendment of the “Natural Born Citizen” Requirement for
the Presidency, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 137, 144 (2007).
161. See Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415; see also Duggin &
Collins, supra note 48, at 78–79.
162. See TUCKER, supra note 145, App. at 323.
163. See CHARLES T. CULLEN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND LAW IN VIRGINIA,
1772–1804, at 160–63 (1987); Davison M. Douglas, Foreword: The Legacy of St. George
Tucker, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2006).
164. See, e.g., Pryor, supra note 149, at 887–88 (“[A]t the time of the framing
of the Constitution, there was no common understanding of what ‘natural born
citizen’ meant.”); see also William T. Han, Beyond Presidential Eligibility: The Natural
Born Citizen Clause as a Source of Birthright Citizenship, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 457 (2010);
Friedman, supra note 160.  This does not require us to resort to the writings of an
eighteenth-century Swiss law professor. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NA-
TIONS 101 (Joseph Chitty & Edward D. Ingraham trans., 1883) (declaring natural
born citizen is one born in country to citizen parents).  For support of reliance on
Vattel, see Jones, supra note 138, at 161.  For rejection of reliance on Vattel, see
MASKELL, supra note 138, at 21–22.
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effect in 1868, the Supreme Court, seeing that there were only two bases
for U.S. citizenship—birth in the United States and naturalization—has
consistently lumped persons born outside the United States to an Ameri-
can parent with “naturalized citizens,” rather than with “citizens born in
the United States” in the terms of that Amendment.165  The amendment
did not say anything directly about the citizenship qualification for Presi-
dent, simply defining as citizens “all persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”166  While the Four-
teenth Amendment does not, in itself, change the qualifications for Presi-
dent,167 the cases interpreting the Amendment, along with the evidence
regarding the probable original meaning of the phrase “natural born citi-
zen” in the qualifications clause, should be compelling reference points
for interpreting the latter phrase: Persons born outside the United States
to an American parent are not “natural born citizens” but are “naturalized
by descent.”168
Jack Maskell of the Congressional Research Service mentions Rogers v.
Bellei but argues that cases declaring that a child born abroad to an Ameri-
can parent and a child born in the United States are “equivalent” as citi-
zens—that the foreign-born child must be a “natural born citizen” or
otherwise they would not be equal.169  Maskell falls into the trap that a
good many commentators have fallen into: taking statements that there
are two ways to acquire citizenship—birth or naturalization—to mean that
persons who become citizens, although born abroad, must be in all re-
spects the same as native-born citizens.170  Yet it is clear that citizens by
naturalization are equal in all respects to natural born citizens except as
regards their eligibility to be become President.171  It would be easier to
assume that the Court, declaring foreign-born children of American citi-
zens to be equal to U.S.-born children, simply was overlooking the one
situation in which they are not equal.
165. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 828 (1971); United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898); see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167–68
(1874) (explaining birth and naturalization are two bases for citizenship without
indicating into which group child born abroad to American parent would fall).
166. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
167. For an argument to the contrary, see Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Could
Arnold Schwarzenegger Run for President Now?, 6 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 331 (2005).  Of
course, neither does a Senate resolution amend the U.S. Constitution, even if
unanimous. See S. Res. 511, 110th Cong. (2008) (regarding citizenship of John
McCain).  For an apparent claim that the resolution does affect the meaning of the
Qualifications Clause, see Clement & Katyal, supra note 143, at 164.
168. See Bellei, 401 U.S. at 828; see also Duggin & Collins, supra note 48, at
79–83; Pryor, supra note 149, at 893–99.
169. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61 (2001); Maskell, supra note 138, at
36–37.  At least one lower court has reached this conclusion. See United States v.
Marguet–Pillado, 648 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011).
170. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423–24 (1998); see also MASKELL,
supra note 138, at 30–31.
171. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 649 (1929).
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Bellei actually tells us the status of Senator Cruz: He was naturalized at
birth; he is not a “natural born citizen.”172  Without addressing this judi-
cial holding, any conclusion that “natural born citizen” includes any per-
son who becomes a citizen at birth is insupportable.  If the foregoing
analysis is correct, Senator Cruz is simply not eligible to be President.  In-
deed, it seems likely that a candidate was on the ballot in 2008 who was not
eligible.  John McCain was born in the Panama Canal Zone, a territory at
the time leased from, but under the sovereignty of, Panama.173  There is a
certain irony, given the campaign against President Obama’s eligibility to
be President, that the ineligible candidate in 2008 was not Barack Obama.
Given the confusion about the term, dicta in a pair of District Court deci-
sions to the contrary should not outweigh the original meaning of the
presidential qualification clause and the clear holdings of the U.S. Su-
preme Court.174
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article has demonstrated that the three TEA Party claims regard-
ing constitutional citizenship are fundamentally flawed.  Congress has no
power to ban birthright citizenship from the children of undocumented
aliens if those children are born in the United States (or from any other
children born in the United States if they were subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States when born).175  Congress has no power to revoke any
citizen’s citizenship without that citizen’s consent, except if the citizenship
has been obtained through fraud.176  And no person not born within the
United States is eligible to be President.177  Perhaps all the foregoing anal-
ysis demonstrates that interpretation of the Constitution has as much or
more to do with what the interpreter wants to find as it has to do with a
careful reading and analysis of historical materials and case precedent.
While the TEA Party’s general claims about constitutional interpretation
172. See, e.g., Duggin & Collins, supra note 48, at 92–96; John R. Hein, Com-
ment, Born in the U.S.A., but Not Natural Born: How Congressional Territorial Policy Bars
Native-Born Puerto Ricans from the Presidency, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423 (2009).  Nor
apparently would persons who became citizens through birth in an unincorpo-
rated territory who became citizens at birth by way of a statute.
173. See Duggin & Collins, supra note 48, at 102–06; Jones, supra note 138, at
174–77; Gabriel J. Chin, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President: Eleven Months
and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1
(2008); Peter J. Spiro, McCain’s Citizenship and Constitutional Method, 107 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 42 (2008).
174. See Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.N.H. 2008).  Note that these dicta
assume that John McCain was a citizen at birth even if born outside the United
States.  For an argument that McCain did not receive U.S. citizenship until eleven
months after his birth even though his parents were U.S. citizens when he was
born, see Chin, supra note 173.
175. See the text and authorities supra at notes 45–94.
176. See supra notes 95–135 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 136–74 and accompanying text.
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are particularly suspect, perhaps ultimately the TEA Party is no less (or
perhaps no more) guilty of this than many other would-be interpreters of
the foundational document of our “civic religion.”178
178. See supra notes 15–44 and accompanying text; see also LEVINSON, supra
note 87 (comparing approaches to interpreting Constitution to approaches to in-
terpreting sacred texts like Bible).
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